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Shared Sovereignty: The Role of Expert
Agencies in Environmental Law
Michael C. Blumm*

Andrea Lang**

Environmental law usually features statutory or administrative
interpretation by a single agency. Less frequent is a close look at the mechanics
of implementing environmental policy across agency lines. In this Article, we
offer a comparative analysis of five statutes and their approaches to sharing
decision-making authority among more than one federal agency. We call this
pluralistic approach to administrative decision making “shared sovereignty.”
In this analysis, we compare implementation of the National Environmental
Policy Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, the Endangered Species Act,
the Clean Water Act, and the Federal Power Act. All of these statutes incorporate
the shared sovereignty paradigm, although they vary in their interpretation of it.
The first two statutes allow commenting and consulting agencies (we call both
“expert” agencies) some authority, often significant, over the decisions of socalled “action agencies.” More decisive authority for expert agencies exists
under the Endangered Species Act. The latter two statutes give expert agencies
conclusive decision-making authority.
We think that drafters of future environmental legislation and regulations
may profit from this comparative analysis of pluralistic agency decision making.
Our view is that shared sovereignty is—and has been—an integral part of
modern environmental law and should continue to be a foundational element in
its future.
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INTRODUCTION
A signature, if overlooked, contribution of environmental law to
administrative law is its pathbreaking reliance on what we call “shared
sovereignty” as a major decision-making paradigm. There is little question that
administrative discretion lies at the center of a good deal of environmental law.1
Copyright © 2015 Regents of the University of California.
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
** J.D. 2015, Lewis and Clark Law School.
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Less often recognized, however, is environmental law’s reliance on shared
sovereignty—dividing decision-making authority among more than one agency.
Since regulating activities that affect the environment is a complex endeavor
which often involves difficult scientific questions and cost estimates,2 Congress
has frequently chosen to divide decision making among agencies in areas such
as historic preservation, endangered species, wetlands preservation, and fish,
wildlife, and federal lands affected by nonfederal hydroelectric projects.
In this Article, we look at the implementation of the shared sovereignty
paradigm in the context of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Federal Power Act (FPA).3 Our analysis
begins with statutes like NEPA and the NHPA, which authorize “comment
agencies” to perform only an apparently advisory role to the primary decision
maker, known as the “action agency.” This Article turns to “consulting agencies”
in the ESA, whose opinions Justice Scalia has declared to be “virtually
determinative,”4 and then we examine the conclusive decision-making authority
accorded to “expert agencies” under the CWA and FPA.
These examples of shared sovereignty in environmental law, which foster
the purposes of all five statutes we studied, make a case for Congress to continue
the shared sovereignty paradigm in the future. These statutes also suggest that
courts should continue to interpret this paradigm as a conscious and sustained
congressional effort to curb action agencies’ discretion to proceed with projects
in the face of opposition from other federal agencies with statutory decisionmaking roles. This shared decision-making paradigm stands in contrast to the
judicial deference accorded to agencies under the Chevron doctrine, which
demands that courts defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
statutory provisions.5 Instead, the paradigm reflects a policy of shared—not
1. See, e.g., The Honorable David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of
Environmental Law, 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
2. See generally Joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional
Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 Yale L.J. 1300 (1983).
3. Although the Clean Air Act has several provisions in its prevention of significant deterioration
program that, at least on their face, seem to require some interagency decision making between federal
agencies or between federal land managers and states, none of these provisions produce the same kind of
complex decision making that we describe as shared sovereignty. For more information on these
provisions, see John-Mark Stensvaag, Preventing Significant Deterioration Under the Clean Air Act: Area
Classification, Initial Allocation, and Redesignation, 41 E.L.R. 10,008, 10,016–17 (2011) (discussing the
PSD program, which allows federal agencies some role in designating and redesignating clean-air areas,
but most of the decisions are left to nonfederal actors). For example, the opinion of federal land managers
in recommending redesignation to Class I areas (the most protective clean-air classification) is only
advisory. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 709 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding
that Kerr-McGee had no standing to challenge a federal redesignation recommendation because the purely
advisory opinion of the federal land manager did not result in any injury).
4. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997).
5. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“When a
challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the
wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564716
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2564716

BLUMM AND LANG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

104

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

11/6/2015 12:07 PM

[Vol. 42:N

exclusive—decision-making authority, which courts should recognize by
continuing to uphold a substantial role for “comment,” “consulting,” and
“expert” agencies—which we often collectively refer to as expert agencies.
Part I of this Article examines the role of comment agencies in influencing
decisions subject to NEPA procedures, which potentially include nearly all
federal proposals. Comment agency positions have had a discernible influence
on judicial scrutiny of action agencies’ efforts to comply with NEPA, which
courts are more likely to find inadequate when comment agencies are critical of
a proposal. Part II turns to NHPA decision making, which involves quite
different procedures and accords more weight to comment agencies. Part III
looks to the ESA and the federal fish and wildlife agencies charged with
consultation, whose biological opinions “virtually determin[e]” statutory
compliance.6 Consequently, the ESA gives more decision-making authority to
its consulting agencies than NEPA or the NHPA. Parts IV and V examine the
operation of section 404(c) of the CWA and sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA,
provisions that provide expert agencies with determinative decision-making
authority not evident in the first three statutes. Part VI suggests that the shared
sovereignty approach to environmental law is an appropriate model in an
administrative law world that increasingly requires multifaceted ecological,
scientific, and economic expertise to make justifiable agency decisions that are
in the long-run public interest.
I.

THE ROLE OF EXPERT COMMENT AGENCIES UNDER NEPA

NEPA requires agencies proposing “major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment” to issue an environmental
impact statement (EIS).7 This seemingly straightforward requirement in fact
requires two steps: (1) deciding whether a proposed action will produce any
significant environmental effects, and (2) if so, preparing an EIS that sufficiently
analyzes and publicly discloses those effects.8 In addition, consistent with
NEPA’s goal of fostering informed agency decision making,9 its implementing
regulations call for federal, state, local, and tribal experts to have an opportunity
to comment at both stages of the process.10
Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”); see E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters:
How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law,
16 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2005).
6. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170.
7. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); see Environmental Impact
Statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2015) (“Environmental impact statement means a detailed written
statement”).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
9. Purpose of NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2015).
10. See Whether to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, id. § 1501.4(b) (2015) (requiring
the action agency to involve “environmental agencies, applicants, and the public, to the extent practicable,
in [deciding whether a proposed action will produce any significant environmental effects]”); Inviting
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Because an EIS is required only for actions that have significant
environmental impacts, a threshold question is whether a proposed project’s
effects will be significant.11 To answer it—assuming a proposal is not
categorically excluded12 from NEPA—an agency will usually prepare a shorter
Environmental Assessment (EA).13 In an EA, the action agency must analyze
and explain the potential environmental impacts of its proposal and either make
a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) or, if significant environmental
effects are likely, decide to prepare an EIS.14
An EIS is a “detailed written statement”15 that addresses, among other
things, the environmental effects of the proposed action, whether any of the
effects can be avoided, and reasonable alternatives to the proposal.16 Before
preparing an EIS, the action agency first conducts a process called “scoping” to
solicit public comment and identify the potential environmental impacts related
to the proposal.17 The agency then writes a draft EIS, which is subject to
comments from other agencies and the public.18 Lastly, the action agency
prepares a final EIS that addresses all comments made on the draft.19
NEPA requires action agencies to consult with expert federal agencies and
accept comments from federal, state, and local agencies.20 Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations21 clarify that this requirement
provides a role for expert agencies at both the threshold EA and EIS stages of
the NEPA process. At the EA stage, “[t]he [action] agency shall involve
Comments on Draft EIS, id. § 1503.1(a)(1) (2015) (requiring the action agency to obtain comments from
federal agencies with “special expertise.”); id. § 1503.1(a)(2) (requiring the action agency to request
comments from tribes, states, and local agencies).
11. Significantly as Used in NEPA, id. § 1508.27 (2015) (stating agencies must consider both the
“context” and “intensity” of an action to determine its significance).
12. Through notice and comment rulemaking, agencies can promulgate regulations establishing socalled “categorical exclusions” for proposals that never, individually or cumulatively, significantly affect
the environment, and therefore require neither an EA nor an EIS. Categorical Exclusion in NEPA, id. §
1508.4 (2015). Categorical exclusions have become a tool that action agencies have attempted to use to
avoid NEPA procedure. For example, in 2005, the Forest Service attempted to categorically exclude
national forest plan approvals, amendments, and revisions from NEPA. National Forest System Land
Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005). A California district court invalidated the rule
in Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1086–87 (N.D. Cal. 2007),
but agencies have not stopped trying to similarly exclude whole kinds of projects using categorical
exclusions. See generally Kevin H. Moriarty, Note, Circumventing the National Environmental Policy
Act: Agency Abuse of the Categorical Exclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2312 (2004); Nathaniel S.W.
Lawrence, A Forest of Objections: The Effort to Drop NEPA Review for National Forest Management Act
Plans, 39 E.L.R. 10,651 (2009).
13. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)–(b).
14. Environmental Assessment, id. § 1508.9(a) (2015).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2015).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
17. Scoping for NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2015).
18. Draft, Final, and Supplemental Statements, id. § 1502.9(a) (2015).
19. Id. § 1502.9(b).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
21. Congress created the CEQ as an executive agency to oversee the implementation of NEPA. Id.
§ 4342. Its regulations implementing NEPA are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501–1508 (2015).
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environmental agencies, applicants, and the public, to the extent practicable.”22
CEQ regulations also require the action agency to list the “agencies and persons
consulted” in its EA.23 At the EIS stage, the regulations encourage the early
involvement of expert comment agencies to comment on draft EISs24 and impose
duties on both the action and commenting expert agencies. The action agency
must “[o]btain” expert comments,25 and the expert agencies have a duty to
provide them.26 Further, action agencies must “request” the comments of
relevant state, local, and tribal interests.27
Although expert comment agencies have no direct control over NEPA
action agencies, their role in the process can indirectly affect the substance of the
decision. As one of us has suggested,28 expert agency disagreement with an
action agency’s decision makes a reviewing court more likely to find a NEPA
violation. Moreover, expert agency comments can lead to an action agency
altering or abandoning proposed projects. The remainder of this Part explores
three ways that expert agencies can affect NEPA decision making: (1)
influencing judicial review of action agency decisions not to prepare an EIS, (2)
influencing judicial review of the adequacy of an EIS, and (3) prompting action
agencies to modify or abandon proposed actions.
A.

Judicial Review of EAs

Most action agencies’ EAs conclude that an EIS is unnecessary,29 so the
ability of expert comment agencies to affect the threshold question of whether a
proposal may result in any “significant impacts” is quite important. Much of their
22.
23.
24.

40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (2015)
Id. § 1508.9(b) (2015).
Id. § 1502.9(a) (requiring action agencies to produce a draft EIS and to “work with the
cooperating agencies and . . . obtain comments as required in part 1503.”); see id. § 1501.1 (2015)
(“Emphasizing cooperative consultation among agencies before the environmental impact statement is
prepared rather than submission of adversary comments on a completed document.”).
25. Inviting Comments on Draft EIS, id. § 1503.1(a)(1) (2015) (requiring the action agency to
“[o]btain the comments of any Federal agency which has . . . special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved or which is authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards.”).
26. Duty to Comment, id. § 1503.2 (2015) (“Federal agencies with jurisdiction by law or special
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved and agencies which are authorized to develop
and enforce environmental standards shall comment on statements within their jurisdiction, expertise, or
authority.” (emphasis added)).
27. Id. § 1503.1(a)(2) (stating that the action agency must request comments from, inter alia,
“[a]ppropriate State and local agencies which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards . . . Indian tribes, when the effects may be on a reservation, . . . and [a]ny agency which has
requested that it receive statements on actions of the kind proposed.”).
28. See Michael C. Blumm & Marla Nelson, Pluralism and the Environment Revisited: The Role
of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 5 (2012); see alsoee Michael C. Blumm &
Stephen R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation,
14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 277 (1990).
29. The ratio of EAs to EISs is somewhere around 100 to 1. Wendy B. Davis, The Fox Is Guarding
the Henhouse: Enhancing the Role of the EPA in FONSI Determinations Pursuant to NEPA, 39 Akron L.
Rev. 35, 41 (2006). This number does not include the projects that qualify for a categorical exclusion to
the EIS process or otherwise do not require an EA.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564716

BLUMM AND LANG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/6/2015 12:07 PM

SHARED SOVEREIGNTY

107

influence exists because EA findings which disagree with their views are more
vulnerable to judicial challenges.
For example, in Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Ninth Circuit overturned an Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) decision not to
prepare an EIS in part because the Corps failed to adequately consider Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) comments.30 In Ocean Advocates, BP (formerly British
Petroleum) sought a permit from the Corps to extend its dock at Cherry Point in
Puget Sound to increase its ability to ship crude oil.31 The FWS, concerned that
the dock would result in increased tanker traffic and a corresponding increased
risk of a major oil spill, submitted comments requesting that the Corps prepare
an EIS addressing these effects.32 Yet the Corps issued the permit anyway on the
basis of its EA’s conclusion that an EIS was unnecessary.33
Ocean Advocates challenged the Corps’ decision not to prepare an EIS, but
the federal district court upheld the decision.34 On appeal the Ninth Circuit
reversed because the Corps’ analysis simply echoed BP’s position on the issue35
without properly considering the FWS’s concern that the proposal would
increase tanker traffic and the risk of an oil spill36 and concluded that the Corps’
decision not to conduct an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.37 The case thus
illustrates how expert agency comments can lead courts to find NEPA
violations.38
The volume of adverse expert agency comments may also play a role in
judicial review at the EA stage. For example, in Friends of Back Bay v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Corps had to prepare
an EIS on permits to build a mooring facility and boat ramp near Back Bay
National Wildlife Refuge in Virginia,39 in part because of the number of public

30.
31.

402 F.3d 846, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2005).
Because its project would affect navigable waters, BP needed a permit from the Corps under
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012); see Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 855.
32. Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d.at 855–56.
33. Id. at 856.
34. Id. at 858.
35. BP argued that the increased berthing capacity at the dock would actually decrease the
possibility of oil spills by reducing the amount of time tankers spend waiting to dock. Id. at 857–58.
36. The concern about the risk of oil spills was also echoed by the Lummi Indian Nation and the
Nooksack Indian Tribe. Id. at 855. However, in analyzing the decision not to prepare an EIS, the court
focused exclusively on the Corps’ failure to consider the FWS comments. Id. at 865–66.
37. Id. at 871.
38. See also Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002) (deciding that a Federal
Highway Administration EA was inadequate because it failed to address the EPA’s concerns about the
effects of a highway construction project); Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d 1147, 1156–57 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (as amended Jan. 30, 2012) (concluding that a Corps EA/FONSI for a mall development project
was inadequate because it did not properly address a FWS scientist’s concern about habitat fragmentation).
39. Since the project would involve dredging and filling in navigable waters, the developer sought
permits under both section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), and section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012). Because many projects require both types of permits, the Corps
allows the same application to serve for both and often issues them both simultaneously. See Processing
of Permits, 33 C.F.R. § 325 (2015).
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comments opposed to the project.40 Before issuing the permits, the Corps
prepared an EA that found no significant impact.41 During public comment on
the permit application, the Corps received “over 350 responses, the
overwhelming majority of which were in opposition to the project.”42 The
district court decided that the decision not to prepare an EIS was within the
Corps’ discretion,43 but the Fourth Circuit vacated that decision.44 The appeals
court seemed particularly concerned that “four respected governmental entities,”
including the FWS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries,45 opposed going forward
with the project as proposed.46 As a result, the court ordered the Corps to prepare
an EIS.47
These are not isolated incidents. Previous articles contain numerous other
examples of the effect of expert agency comment on judicial review.48 Taken
together, these cases illustrate the effect of expert agencies’ comments. Although
expert agencies do not make the ultimate decision as to whether NEPA requires
an EIS on a particular proposal, their comments can make it more likely that a
reviewing court will conclude that an action agency erred in deciding not to
prepare one.
B.

Judicial Review of EIS Adequacy

Expert federal agencies, states, and tribes can also play a role when courts
review the adequacy of a full EIS. The action agency’s duty to obtain expert
agency comments on draft EISs and to respond to comments in final EISs49
includes an obligation to provide a “meaningful response to serious and
considered comments by experts.”50 For example, in Western Watersheds v.
Kraayenbrink, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed regulations
that would have reduced environmental protection and public comment on
federal grazing permits.51 Both the FWS and EPA raised concerns52 about the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Friends of Back Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 681 F.3d 581, 590 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 589.
The mayor of Virginia Beach also commented on the proposal. Id. at 583–84, 590.
Id. at 590.
Id.
See Blumm & Nelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Blumm & Brown, supra

note 29.
49. Draft, Final, and Supplemental Statements, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (2015) (stating the action
agency “shall discuss at appropriate points in the final statement any responsible opposing view which
was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and shall indicate the agency’s response to the issues
raised.”).
50. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 492–93 (9th Cir. 2011).
51. Id. at 476.
52. In fact, BLM’s own experts raised the same concerns about the grazing permits. See id. at 487.
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proposed regulations in their comments.53 When BLM failed to “conduct a
studied review and response to concerns about the environmental implications”
of its actions in its final EIS, the district court determined that the EIS violated
NEPA.54 The Ninth Circuit affirmed and enjoined enforcement of the
regulations.55
Comments by states and tribes also may affect a reviewing court’s
determination on the adequacy of EISs. In Western Watersheds both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit found the EIS inadequate based on BLM’s failure to
address not only FWS’s concerns, but also those of the New Mexico Department
of Game and Fish, California Department of Fish and Game, Arizona
Department of Game and Fish, and other expert state agencies.56 Likewise in
Audubon Society v. Department of Navy, the Fourth Circuit relied on state
comments to affirm a district court decision on the adequacy of the Navy’s EIS
on a proposed landing field for its aircraft.57 In that case, the state wildlife
agency’s comments on the EIS expressed concern about accidental bird strikes.58
The district court decided, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, that the Navy failed
to adequately address the state agency’s concerns in its EIS.59
Tribal comments played a similar role in Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Norton.60 There BLM prepared an EIS analyzing the effects of developing coal
bed methane fields in the Powder River Basin in Montana and Wyoming.61 The
Northern Cheyenne Tribe, among others, commented that BLM should consider
an additional alternative, called “phased development.”62 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s determination that BLM’s failure to consider the
tribe’s proposed alternative made the EIS inadequate.63

53. FWS was concerned that “the proposed reduction in public oversight may constrain biologists
and range conservationists from recommending and implementing management changes and that ‘[FWS]
believe[s] these aspects of the proposed revisions have the potential to be detrimental to fish and wildlife
resources.’” Id. at 488 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). State agencies raised similar concerns
about the proposed regulations, see id.
54. Id. at 492.
55. Id. at 492–93 (“When an agency, such as the BLM, submits proposed regulatory changes for
public comment and then offers no meaningful response to serious and considered comments by experts,
that agency renders the procedural requirement meaningless and the EIS an exercise in form over
substance.” (citations omitted)).
56. Id. at 492 (“[T]he BLM never seriously considered the concerns raised by . . . the California
Department of Fish and Game, among others, that the 2006 Regulations weaken the ability of the BLM to
manage rangelands in a timely fashion.”).
57. 422 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2005).
58. Id. at 189–90.
59. Id. at 191–92.
60. 503 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2007).
61. Id. at 840.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 844.
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Project Modifications by Action Agencies

A largely untold story of NEPA implementation concerns the fact that
action agencies often alter or abandon projects as a result of the process itself,
before litigation arises. In an early NEPA case, Justice Marshall noted that the
final EIS itself, and any ensuing litigation, is only the “tip of an iceberg, the
visible evidence of an underlying planning and decision making process that is
usually unnoticed by the public.”64 Justice Marshall was quoting from a 1975
CEQ report issued just five years after NEPA’s enactment which explained that,
quite apart from NEPA litigation, the NEPA process had resulted in “scores” of
project changes and abandonments in that year alone.65
The CEQ report did not address whether expert agency comments had a
hand in the ultimate decision to modify or abandon projects, but it did allude to
agency comments’ potential to alter action agency decisions outside the context
of litigation. This is no doubt because reviewing courts place considerable weight
on expert agency comments. In turn, since expert agency concerns about federal
proposals make action agency EAs and EISs more vulnerable in court, those
comments encourage agencies to change their projects to address concerns
before litigation ensues.
Case law reveals this interagency dynamic. In Greater Yellowstone v.
Flowers, EPA raised concerns about the environmental effects of building weirs
(small dams) on the Snake River as part of a plan to convert ranchland into an
eighteen-hole golf course and residential area.66 Although the Tenth Circuit
affirmed a district court decision that an EIS was not required, it did so because
the Corps had responded to EPA’s comments by adopting monitoring
requirements and promising to modify or remove the weirs in the event of
unacceptable environmental results.67 Greater Yellowstone is just one of many
instances where expert agency comments resulted in the alteration of an action
agency project to reduce adverse environmental effects.
Although arguably the most “procedural” of the statutes analyzed in this
Article, NEPA is far from a “paper tiger.”68 In particular, expert federal agencies
play a significant role in judicial review at both the EA and the EIS stage and
their comments can prompt an action agency to alter its proposal even absent a
court challenge. Reviewing courts can also rely on adverse comments made by

64.
65.

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 418 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring).
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 628–32 (1975) (citing projects
proposed by the Department of Interior, the former Atomic Energy Commission and its successors, the
Corps, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
66. 359 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir. 2004).
67. Id.
68. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that Congress did not intend NEPA to be “a paper tiger”). For a recent
assessment of NEPA’s effect on substantive decision making, see John Ruple & Mark Capane, NEPA—
Substantive Effectiveness Under a Procedural Mandate: Assessment of Oil and Gas EISs in the Mountain
West (2015) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2585207.
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expert state agencies and tribes in finding EAs or EISs inadequate. Thus, as
Congress prescribed, NEPA allows expert agencies to affect substance by
playing a prominent role in process.
II. THE NHPA’S SECTION 106 CONSULTATION
The NHPA requires federal action agencies to consider the effects of
proposed projects on “any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure,
or object included on, or eligible for inclusion on, the National Register [of
Historic Places].”69 Part II explains the NHPA’s decision-making structure,
explains the role of expert agencies in decision making, and discusses how much
authority the expert agencies have at each step in the process.
A.

NHPA Decision Making

Congress passed the NHPA in 1966 to preserve properties70 of historical
and cultural significance, recognizing that urban growth threatened to destroy
much of this irreplaceable heritage.71 The primary mechanism Congress
designed to accomplish this goal was section 106 which requires agencies to
consider effects of federal agency “undertakings”72 on historic properties, and
creates an independent federal agency, the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation (Council), to implement section 106 and comment on proposed
action agency undertakings.73
Like NEPA, there are threshold requirements that trigger the NHPA’s
section 106 requirements: (1) the federal action agency must decide if the
proposed project is a federal “undertaking,” a broad category which may include
either federal funding or permitting;74 (2) the action agency must decide whether
any “district, site, building, structure, or object included in, or eligible for
inclusion in, the National Register” is present;75 and (3) the agency must
determine whether the project has “potential effects” on the property.76 Although
the statute and its regulations do not expressly require consultation or comment

69. National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C.A. § 300308 (2015). The National Register is a
list of “districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture,
archeology, engineering and culture.” Authorization and Expansion of the National Register, 36 C.F.R. §
60.1(a) (2015).
70. Including “any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object included on, or
eligible for inclusion on, the National Register.” 54 U.S.C.A. § 300308.
71. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, The National Historic Preservation Act 1.
72. An undertaking is “[a] project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct
or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including those carried out by or on behalf of a Federal agency;
those carried out with Federal financial assistance; and those requiring a Federal permit, license or
approval.” Definitions in National Historic Preservation Act, 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y) (2015).
73. 54 U.S.C.A. § 304101 (2015).
74. Initiation of the Section 106 Process, 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a) (2015).
75. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(l)(1). We refer to “districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects” as
“property” throughout Part II.
76. Identification of Historic Properties, id. § 800.4(a)(1) (2015)
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from states, tribes, or the Council concerning the “undertaking”77 or the
“potential to affect”78 questions, the regulations do require consultation with
states and tribes to determine whether there are any historical properties within
the scope of the project.79
If a project meets the threshold requirements, the action agency must engage
in section 106 review, including an analysis of effects and an opportunity for the
Council to comment.80 The NHPA imposes no requirement analogous to an EA
or EIS under NEPA. Instead, the analysis of potential effects takes place as a
dialogue between the action agency and consulted states, tribes, and the
Council—if it decides to get involved.81 Hence the NHPA requires action
agencies to consult with various parties both at the threshold stage—to determine
whether its action triggers section 106—as well as analyzing the potential effects
of its proposal on historic properties.
B.

Consultation at the Threshold Stage: Identifying Historical Properties

Assuming there is a federal undertaking, the issue of whether there is a
historical property within the project area was initially an easy question to
resolve because the original section 106 applied only to properties listed in the
National Register. However, in 1976 Congress complicated this threshold
question by expanding section 106 requirements to properties “eligible for
inclusion” in the National Register.82 NHPA regulations subsequently clarified
how an action agency must determine whether a potentially affected historic
property exists.83 The agency must consult with state historic preservation
77. Id. § 800.3(a) (“The [action] agency . . . shall determine whether the proposed Federal action is
an undertaking”).
78. Id. (“The [action] agency . . . shall determine whether the proposed federal action is . . . a type
of activity that has the potential to cause effects on historic properties.”).
79. Id. § 800.4(a)(3) (requiring the action agency to “[s]eek information, as appropriate, from
consulting parties, and other individuals and organizations likely to have knowledge of, or concerns with,
historic properties in the area, and identify issues relating to the undertaking’s potential effects on historic
properties”).
80. 54 U.S.C.A. § 306108 (2015) (requiring the action agency to “take into account the effect of
the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion
in the National Register” and to provide the Council a “reasonable opportunity to comment.”).
81. Telephone interview by Andrea Lang with Amy Cole, Senior Program Officer and Regional
Attorney at The National Trust for Historic Preservation, Denver Field Office (Nov. 5, 2014)
82. 54 U.S.C.A. § 300308 (2015).
83. First, the federal action agency, in consultation with the state and and/or tribal historic
preservation officer (SHPO/THPO), must identify the area of potential effects by gathering information
from “consulting parties, and other individuals and organizations likely to have knowledge of, or concerns
with, historic properties in the area.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a). Next, the action agency and consulting parties
must “take the steps necessary to identify historic properties within the area of potential effects.” Id. §
800.4(b). Once the agency has identified potentially significant properties, it, along with any consulting
parties, must apply the National Register criteria to decide if the property is eligible for listing. Id. §
800.4(c)(1). The criteria regard properties as historic if they: (1) are associated with historically significant
events, or (2) historically significant people, (3) embody a distinctive architecture or historic style, or (4)
have or may yield important historical information. The criteria also provide some potential categories of
historic properties, including those associated with famous events or people; embody “distinctive
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officers (SHPOs), tribal historic preservation officers (THPOs), and tribes that
“attach religious and cultural significance to properties” in order to decide
whether there are any eligible properties within the project’s scope.84
Like NEPA, the NHPA’s regulations specify that consultation with states
and tribes should “commence early in the planning process.”85 Thus NHPA
decision making requires consultation even at the threshold stage. Although
courts typically defer to the action agency concerning the determination of the
“area of potential effects,”86 consultation plays a much more significant role in
determining whether there are properties with historical significance within that
area.
1.

Tribal Involvement in Identifying Historical Properties

In 1992 Congress amended the NHPA to require consultation with tribes to
identify historic properties.87 NHPA regulations now require action agencies to
make a “reasonable and good faith effort” to “identify historic properties within
the area of potential effects” in consultation with tribes.88 Although states can
and do also play a role in identifying historic properties, NHPA regulations treat
tribes as possessing “special expertise,” and courts have ruled that action
agencies must give “special consideration” to tribal consultation in identifying
historic properties.89 Notwithstanding this special role that tribes have in
characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that
possess high artistic values;” or are properties having important information about history. Criteria for
Evaluation of Properties, id. § 60.4 (2015).
84. Id. § 800.4(b).
85. Participants in the Section 106 Process, id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2015); Cooperating Agencies
Under NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(a)(1) (2015) (“The lead agency shall . . . [r]equest the participation of
each cooperating agency in the NEPA process at the earliest possible time.”).
86. See Valley Cmty. Pres. Comm’n v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 1078, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 2004) (ruling
the Federal Highway Administration’s determination of the area of potential effects around a highway
expansion required a high degree of administrative expertise, and was therefore entitled to substantial
judicial deference); see also Safeguarding the Historic Hanscom Area’s Irreplaceable Res., Inc. v. Fed.
Aviation Admin., 651 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding Federal Aviation Administration’s
assessment of the area of potential effects from the construction of an aircraft service center was not
arbitrary and capricious, since the agency considered alternatives and supported its findings with an
investigation).
87. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, sec.
4006(a)(2), § 101(d), 106 Stat. 4755–57 (1992). This amendment was a codification of principles the
National Park Service announced in “Bulletin 38,” which for the first time recognized that properties with
cultural significance might be eligible for inclusion in the National Register. See PATRICIA L. PARKER &
THOMAS F. KING, NAT’L PARK SERV., NAT’L REG. BULL. 38, GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND
DOCUMENTING
TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL
PROPERTIES
(rev.
ed.
1998),
www.nps.gov/history/nr/publications/bulletins/nrb38; see generally S. Rheagan Alexander, Tribal
Consultation for Large-Scale Projects: The National Historic Preservation Act and Regulatory Review,
32 Pace L. Rev. 895 (2012).
88. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b).
89. See id. § 800.4(c)(1) (“The agency official shall acknowledge that Indian tribes and Native
Hawaiian organizations possess special expertise in assessing the eligibility of historic properties that may
possess religious and cultural significance to them.”); see also Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian
Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Indian tribes are

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564716

BLUMM AND LANG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

114

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

11/6/2015 12:07 PM

[Vol. 42:N

consultation at the identification stage, the action agency need only “make
reasonable and good faith efforts” to consult.90
For example, in Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, the Forest Service
proposed a new management plan for Las Huertas Canyon in New Mexico. The
plan area contained pueblo shrines and ceremonial paths which the Sandia
Pueblo used to gather evergreen boughs for cultural ceremonies.91 The Forest
Service mailed form letters and held meetings to request specific information
about historically significant property in the project area,92 but the tribe would
not provide any public information because of the “secrecy which is crucial to
Pueblo religious and cultural practices,”93 although it did confidentially inform
the Forest Service that a potentially eligible property existed.94 The district court
ruled that the Forest Service had made a reasonable and good faith effort to
identify historic property, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.95 Because the tribe
notified the Forest Service of the existence of a potentially eligible property, and
the Forest Service failed to investigate, the appeals court decided that the agency
had not made a reasonable good faith effort and remanded to the Forest Service
to comply with the NHPA.96 Moreover, because the Forest Service failed to
provide the information supplied by the tribe to the SHPO, the court decided that
the agency had also failed in its duty to consult with the state.97
On the other hand, some courts have been more hesitant to conclude that an
action agency failed to make a reasonable good faith effort to consult with tribes
in identifying historic properties. For example, in Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v.
U.S. Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court decision and ruled
that the Forest Service adequately consulted with the Muckleshoot Tribe to
identify historic property98 affected by a proposed land exchange in Mt. Baker–
Snoqualmie National Forest in Washington State.99 In an effort to identify
potentially affected properties of historical or cultural significance, the Forest
Service had conducted its own investigation and requested information from
tribes in the area.100 Yet because the Muckleshoot Tribe claimed that the agency

entitled to special consideration in the course of an agency’s fulfillment of its consultation obligations.”
(emphasis in original)).
90. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1).
91. Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 857–58 (10th Cir. 1995).
92. Id. at 860.
93. Id. at 861.
94. Id. at 860.
95. Id. at 857.
96. Id. See also Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 755 F.
Supp. 2d 1104, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (holding the Bureau of Land Management did not adequately
consult under the NHPA because its “invitation to ‘consult,’ . . . amounted to little more than a general
request for the Tribe to gather its own information about all sites within the area and disclose it at public
meetings.”).
97. Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 862.
98. 177 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 1999).
99. Id. at 803.
100. Id. at 806.
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ignored its assertions that there were other culturally significant properties in the
area, the district court decided that the Forest Service had not made a reasonable
good faith effort to consult.101
The Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that “[t]he Tribe was unable, or
unwilling, to provide information sufficient to persuade the Agency that it should
reconsider its decisions,” and that it had missed opportunities to reveal more
information to the Forest Service.102 Accordingly, the court decided that
“[a]lthough the Forest Service could have been more sensitive to the needs of the
Tribe,” it had made a reasonable and good faith effort to identify historic
properties.103 The court distinguished Pueblo of Sandia on the ground that the
Forest Service’s efforts were not “as egregious” because the Forest Service
“continued to seek the requested information over time” and conducted its own
independent investigation, which represented a reasonable and good faith effort
to identify properties.104
Consequently, although NHPA regulations indicate that tribes possess
special expertise in identifying sites of historical and cultural significance, the
case law suggests that tribes’ ability to influence the identification of historic
property is sometimes hampered by their unwillingness to disclose information
about sites or their failure to comment promptly. As Pueblo of Sandia
acknowledged, tribes may be “reticen[t] to disclose details of their cultural and
religious practices,”105 and this desire to safeguard sites of religious and cultural
significance may undermine their role in NHPA consultation. To ensure that
tribes play the role that Congress intended, agencies need to find ways to ensure
that tribal information stays confidential and tribes must make careful costbenefit analyses about whether to disclose it.106

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 804.
Id. at 806–07.
Id. at 807.
Id. See also Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161, 169 (1st Cir.
2003) (reasoning that because the Narrangensett Tribe failed to submit information on property of historic
or cultural significance until after the required thirty day review period, the Warwick Sewer Authority
made “reasonable [and] good faith efforts” to identify historic properties when it provided the tribe with
information, engaged it about the project, and solicited its comments).
105. Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 861 (10th Cir. 1995); see PARKER & KING,
supra note 87, at 8 (“It is important to understand the role that the information being solicited may play
in the culture of those from whom it is being solicited, and the kinds of rules that may surround its
transmittal. In some societies traditional information is regarded as powerful, even dangerous. It is often
believed that such information should be transmitted only under particular circumstances or to particular
kinds of people. In some cases information is regarded as a valued commodity for which payment is in
order, in other cases offering payment may be offensive. Sometimes information may be regarded as a
gift, whose acceptance obligates the receiver to reciprocate in some way, in some cases by carrying out
the activity to which the information pertains.”).
106. See Ethan Plaut, Tribal-Agency Confidentiality: A Catch-22 for Sacred Site Management?, 36
Ecology L.Q. 137 (2009) (outlining the scope of tribal confidentiality issues and suggesting solutions for
agency and tribal practitioners).
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Deciding Eligibility for Listing in the National Register

Once a state or tribe properly identifies a potentially significant property,
NHPA regulations establish another form of consultation involving the federal
Keeper of the National Register (Keeper).107 When an action agency and a state
or tribe cannot agree whether an identified property meets the National Register
criteria108—or if the Council requests it—the Keeper will determine its
eligibility for listing.109 The Keeper’s role in determining eligibility is greater
than that of expert agencies discussed so far because the Keeper applies the
eligibility criteria absent any consultation.110 The Keeper, in other words, is an
independent expert authority whose eligibility decisions are conclusive.111
Assuming it decides to involve itself, the Council’s role in determining
whether a project is eligible for National Register listing can be crucial, since it
can request a conclusive determination from the Keeper. For example, in Friends
of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Board, the Surface
Transportation Board (STB) permitted a rail carrier to discontinue use of a rail
line that a preservation group argued was a potentially historic property eligible
for listing in the National Register.112 Although the STB and the Pennsylvania
SHPO had initially agreed that the rail line itself was not eligible for listing, the
state later changed its position, leading the Council to request a formal
determination by the Keeper.113 Yet the STB maintained that since the Keeper’s
determination came after a previous agreement that the rail line was ineligible, it
did not have to consider the Keeper’s findings.114 The Third Circuit disagreed,115
deciding that because the Council had brought the Keeper into the process the
action agency could not ignore the Keeper’s independent authority to determine
the property’s eligibility for listing.116
For states, tribes, and the Council, the ability to trigger the Keeper’s
involvement if they disagree with the action agency gives them leverage in light

107. The Keeper of the National Register is a National Park Service official with the authority to
officially designate properties as eligible for inclusion in the National Register. Definitions in National
Historic Preservation Act, 30 C.F.R. § 60.3(f) (2015).
108. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
109. Identification of Historic Properties, 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(c)(2) (2015) (“If the agency official and
the [state/tribe] do not agree, or if the Council or the [Keeper] so request, the agency official shall obtain
a determination of eligibility from the [Keeper]”).
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. See Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434, 441 n.13 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding the Keeper’s
determination as to the eligibility of property for listing is conclusive); Moody Hill Farms Ltd. P’ship v.
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 205 F.3d 554, 558 (2d Cir.1999) (holding the Keeper has “independent
authority” to determine whether a property should be listed as historic).
112. Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 250–51
(3d Cir. 2001).
113. Id. at 256–57.
114. Id. at 264.
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 2321(a) (2012) (granting the court of appeals jurisdiction over “proceeding[s]
to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the Surface Transportation Board.”).
116. Friends of the Atglen, 252 F.3d at 264.
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of the conclusive nature of the Keeper’s findings. Moreover, since waiting for
the Keeper’s formal determination may delay projects, many action agencies
give consulting parties the benefit of the doubt as to whether a property is eligible
for listing.117 On the other hand, neither the Council nor the states or tribes
control the Keeper’s determinations. Formal determinations are also rarely
requested, either because consulting parties are unaware of their ability to do so,
or because threatening to or actually requesting a formal determination can
antagonize other parties, making later parts of section 106 consultation more
difficult.118 Although rarely requested, the involvement of the Keeper represents
a kind of exogenous decision-making power that does not exist under NEPA. An
entity other than the action agency possesses final decision-making authority,
albeit only for the narrow decision of whether an eligible property exists.
C.

Assessing and Resolving Adverse Effects

Like NEPA, section 106 of the NHPA is largely procedural.119 Just as
NEPA forces action agencies to take a “hard look” at the effects of their
proposals on the environment,120 the NHPA requires them to “stop, look, and
listen” before proceeding with a project that could affect listed or potential
National Register properties.121 Once an action agency determines that its
proposed “undertaking” has the potential to affect a historic property, section
106’s regulations require consultation with SHPOs, THPOs, tribes, and other
parties to assess whether the project will result in any adverse effects122 and to
“resolve” those effects.123 The “assess adverse effects” step is similar to NEPA’s
EA, while the “resolve adverse effects” step is similar to the EIS in that the goal
is to develop and evaluate alternatives and mitigation measures. However, the
two statutes’ decision-making processes are quite different because the NHPA
requires no formalized document detailing either decision. Consultation at both

117. Interview by Andrea Lang with Jennifer Richman, Deputy District Counsel, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers Eng’rs (Oct. 22, 2014), in Portland, Oregon; see FED. PRESERVATION INST., PATTERNS IN
DETERMINATIONS OF NATIONAL REGISTER ELIGIBILITY, 1987–2006, at 1 (2007),
http://www.nps.gov/fpi/Documents/Patterns%20in%20DOE.pdf. (“It may . . . be that Federal agencies
have chosen not to debate National Register eligibility in borderline cases, as formal determinations may
delay project execution.”).
118. Richman, supra note 117.
119. Friends of the Atlgen, 252 F.3d. at 263 (holding the NHPA “is a procedural rather than a
substantive statute”); but see Ruple & Capane, supra note 68 (explaining the substantive effects of
procedure).
120. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
121. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161, 169 (1st Cir. 2003);
Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1994).
122. Assessment of Adverse Effects, 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a) (2015) (requiring the action agency to
“apply the criteria of adverse effect to historic properties within the area of potential effects”).
123. Resolution of Adverse Effects, id. § 800.6(a) (2015) (requiring the action agency to “consult
with the SHPO/THPO and other consulting parties, including Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations, to develop and evaluate alternatives or modifications to the undertaking that could avoid,
minimize, or mitigate adverse effects on historic properties.”).
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steps under the NHPA produces an ongoing dialogue between action agency and
consulted parties rather than the formal comments and writings that occur under
NEPA.
1.

Assessing Adverse Effects

Under NHPA regulations, adverse effects exist when a project will directly
or indirectly alter “any of the characteristics of a historic property that qualify
the property for inclusion in the National Register in a manner that would
diminish the integrity of the property’s location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling, or association.”124 Significantly, the regulations stipulate
that the action agency “shall consider” the views of “consulting parties”125 and
the public in assessing whether the project will result in an adverse effect.126 If
the action agency concludes after this consultation that the project will not
adversely affect the property, it issues a “finding of no adverse effect.”127
Consulting parties then have the opportunity to concur with the action agency’s
finding,128 resolve disagreements, or request comment from the Council.129 This
authority gives consulting agencies under the NHPA power that does not exist
under NEPA, which requires no concurrence.
Little case law exists on the effect of consulting parties’ concurrence—or
lack thereof—on action agency findings of no adverse effects. However, officials
from both the Corps and the National Trust for Historic Preservation believe the
concurrence power of consulting states and tribes results in better substantive
outcomes for historic preservation.130 According to one participant, many action
agencies consider concurrence from states and tribes a prerequisite to moving
forward on a project and will actively engage consulting parties to obtain it.131
Unlike NEPA’s EA process, which can generate extensive written records,
NHPA consultation involves “much more talking, and much less writing” as
action agencies and consulting parties engage in an ongoing dialogue to reach
agreement on the adverse effects a project is likely to have.132 This
conversational approach may explain why there is little case law—there is simply
not a written record for a court to review. A more positive explanation, however,
is that there may be little litigation because NHPA consultation resolves many
conflicts without judicial intervention.133

124.
125.

Id. § 800.5(a)(1).
Consulting parties under the NHPA are expert agencies, including the Council, states, and
tribes. Participants in the Section 106 Process. Id. § 800.2(c) (2015).
126. Id. § 800.5.
127. Id. § 800.5(b).
128. Id. § 800.5(c)(1).
129. Id. § 800.5(c)(2).
130. Richman, supra note 117; Cole, supra note 81.
131. Cole, supra note 81.
132. Id.
133. Richman, supra note 117.
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Where action agencies and consulting parties disagree about a finding of no
adverse effects, the Council may review the action agency’s finding.134 In a 1999
rule, the Council went further, giving itself final decision-making authority as to
whether a project would result in an adverse effect on a historic property.135
However, in National Mining Association v. Slater, an industry group
successfully challenged the rule.136 A district court held that because section 106
expressly gives substantive decision-making authority to action agencies, the
Council could not use a regulation to effectively reassign that authority to
itself.137 Consequently, current NHPA regulations only allow the Council to
issue an advisory opinion to the action agency if it disagrees with its finding of
no adverse effects.138 Final decision-making authority on the adverse effects of
proposed actions remains with the action agency.139
2.

Resolving Adverse Effects

If the action agency determines that the project will result in adverse effects
to an historic property, it must engage consulting parties to “develop and evaluate
alternatives or modifications to the undertaking that could avoid, minimize, or
mitigate adverse effects.”140 Although conceptually similar to the NEPA
process, this duty to evaluate alternatives is in practice quite different. Like the
NHPA’s assessing adverse effects stage, it involves much less documentation
than NEPA requires.141 If the consulting parties do not concur with the action
agency on how to resolve adverse effects and sign a memorandum of agreement
to that effect, consultation “terminates” and the Council issues a formal

134.
135.

36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c)(2)(ii).
Protection of Historic Properties, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,580 (Sept. 13, 1996) (codified at 36 C.F.R. §
800.4(d)(2) (1999)).
136. 167 F. Supp. 2d 265, 287 (D.D.C. 2001), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Nat’l Min. Ass’n v.
Fowler, 324 F.3d 752 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
137. Id. (“Making [a no adverse effects determination], however, is the one substantive role that is
expressly delegated to the agency in section 106 of the Act. [The Council’s regulations] thereby enable
the Council to interfere directly with the agency’s responsibility in this respect, and as such, they are
impermissible substantive regulations.”).
138. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c)(3)(i).
139. Id. § 800.5(c)(3)(ii)(B).
140. Resolution of Adverse Effects, id. § 800.6(a) (2015). The action agency must also notify the
Council of its continuing consultation, id. § 800.6(a)(1), provide documentation of the consultation
process, id. § 800.6(a)(3), and as notify and provide documentation to the public, id. § 800.6(a)(4). The
Council may join the consultation process if it wishes, or if the action agency requests. Id.
141. Under NHPA regulations, the outcome of consultation at this stage is a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), in which the consulting parties agree to a particular course of action to resolve the
adverse effects. Id. § 800.6(b)(1). The only consulting parties which must sign the MOA are the lead
agency official, the SHPO/THPO, and (if it has joined the consultation process) the Council. Id. Other
consulting parties, called “invited signatories,” do not need to sign the MOA to complete the “resolution
of adverse effect” process. Unlike at other stages of the NHPA process, consulting tribes play a lesser role
than SHPOs/THPOs and are not required signatories. Id. § 800.6(c)(2). The MOA “evidences the agency
official’s compliance with section 106 and . . . govern[s] the undertaking and all of its parts.” Id. §
800.6(c).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564716

BLUMM AND LANG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

120

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

11/6/2015 12:07 PM

[Vol. 42:N

comment, which the action agency must take into account before reaching a final
decision on the undertaking.142 The effect of this comment is similar to that of
an expert agency comment under NEPA, in that the action agency must carefully
consider and explain any divergence from Council opinion.143 Also like NEPA,
the resolution of adverse effects is not binding on the action agency, which
retains ultimate decision-making authority.144
As with concurrence on a no adverse effects finding, the lack of case law
on the effect of consulting parties’ concurrence may reflect the NHPA’s efficacy.
According to NHPA participants at the Corps and the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, few projects receive a formal Council comment because of the
political “black mark” that results from terminating consultation.145 Further, in
most cases, action agencies would rather come to some kind of agreement
through dialogue with consulting agencies than face the time and expense of
seeking and waiting for a formal Council comment.146 Hence consulting expert
agencies under the NHPA appear to have the bargaining power to leverage action
agencies into adopting favorable alternatives or mitigation.147
III. THE ESA’S FEDERAL CONSULTATION UNDER SECTION 7
Section 7 of the ESA, a statute that has been called the “pit bull” of
environmental law,148 requires that federal agencies engaged in actions likely to
adversely affect listed species consult with either the FWS or the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively “Services”)149 to ensure that
proposed actions do not “jeopardize” the species’ continued existence or damage

142.
143.

Failure to Resolve Adverse Effects, id. § 800.7 (2015).
See Citizens Alliance, Inc. v. Slater, 176 F.3d 686, 696 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] federal agency
undertaking a project affecting historic properties is not obligated to give the [Council’s] opinion so much
weight that it is foreclosed from making its own decision, though it must make clear in the record that the
[Council’s] comments were taken seriously”).
144. See Effects of Listing Under Federal Law, 36 C.F.R. § 60.2(a) (2015) (“While the Advisory
Council comments must be taken into account and integrated into the decision-making process, [final]
decisions rest with the agency implementing the undertaking.”); see also Waterford Citizens Ass’n v.
Reilly, 970 F.2d 1287,1290 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[The] procedural regulatory scheme guides agencies
contemplating a project . . . . The final outcome of that process, however, demonstrates the limited
obligation of the agency.”).
145. Richman, supra note 117; Cole, supra note 81.
146. Richman, supra note 117.
147. A preferred mitigation measure of an action agency may be to make a movie or exhibit to
preserve the historical significance of an adversely affected property, while a consulting party may prefer
that the agency promise to save or restore another similar property. Whether to pursue one or both of the
methods depends on negotiations between the agency and consulting parties as the agency attempts to
convince the parties to sign the memorandum of agreement. Cole, supra note 81.
148. See Nathan Baker, Water, Water, Everywhere, and at Last a Drop for Salmon? NRDC v.
Houston Heralds New Prospects Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 607, 613
(1999) (quoting Donald Barry, Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks of the Department of
Interior).
149. For effects on listed terrestrial and freshwater species, the action agency must consult with
FWS; for effects on listed marine and anadromous species, the action agency must consult with NMFS.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564716

BLUMM AND LANG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/6/2015 12:07 PM

SHARED SOVEREIGNTY

121

their critical habitat.150 This Part explores the effect of the Services’ opinions
during ESA consultation. As under NEPA, expert agency involvement creates a
record that often makes it more difficult for a court to defer to an action agency’s
unilateral choices. Moreover, the ESA’s structure and the role of the Services
under the statute make the effect of their opinions more determinative than those
of expert agencies under either NEPA or the NHPA.
A.

ESA Consultation Overview

Before exploring the effects of federal consultation under the ESA, a brief
explanation of how consultation requirements are triggered is necessary because,
as with the statutes discussed above, avoiding consultation provides safe harbor
for an action agency. The ESA requires action agencies to consult the relevant
Service when two threshold requirements are met: (1) there is a discretionary
agency action,151 and (2) the action “may affect” a listed species or critical
habitat.152
The statute defines the first triggering requirement of “agency action”
broadly to include any action “authorized, funded, or carried out” by any federal
agency.153 Courts have recognized that there is “little doubt” that Congress
intended “agency action” to have broad applicability.154 However, ESA
regulations confine the definition of “agency action” to those actions that are
discretionary,155 a view the Supreme Court upheld in National Association of
Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife.156 The ESA discretionary act
requirement is therefore similar to NEPA’s, which also requires an agency action
to be discretionary to trigger the statute’s procedural requirements.157
The second triggering requirement, that the action “may affect” a listed
species, requires the action agency to determine whether there are any listed
species or critical habitat within the scope of the proposed action.158 Once the
action agency has formally requested information from the relevant Service, it
must determine whether its proposal “may affect” that species or its critical

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012).
50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2014).
Id. § 402.14(a) (2014).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
See, e.g., Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012).
50 C.F.R. § 402.03.
551 U.S. 644, 673 (2007). In Homebuilders, environmental groups challenged EPA’s approval
of the State of Arizona to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
program under the CWA. Id. at 654–55. EPA argued that because the statute required it to hand over
NPDES permitting authority, its action was nondiscretionary, and thus no consultation with the Services
was necessary. Id. at 654. The Supreme Court agreed with EPA, deferring to the regulation as a reasonable
interpretation of section 7 of the ESA. Id. at 673.
157. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004) (“[B]ecause [the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration] ha[d] no discretion to prevent the entry of Mexican trucks, its EA did not
need to consider the environmental effects arising from the entry.”).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
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habitat.159 To avoid consultation, the action agency must conclude that its action
will have no effect on any species or critical habitat within the project area.
However, at least in the Ninth Circuit, the “may affect” threshold is a low bar,
including “[a]ny possible effect, whether beneficial, benign, adverse or of an
undetermined character.”160 Therefore although an action agency can avoid
consulting with the Services by simply concluding its action will have no effect
on any listed species, that finding may be vulnerable to challenge in court.161
Once an agency action triggers consultation, the agency must consult with
the relevant Service through either formal or informal consultation. In informal
consultation, which—much like an EA under NEPA—determines the need for
formal consultation, an action agency assesses the likely effect of its actions on
listed species.162 If the agency determines that the action is “not likely to
adversely affect” a listed species or critical habitat, the Service must concur with
that determination in order for the project to proceed without formal
consultation.163 Without concurrence, the action agency must initiate formal
consultation,164 culminating in a biological opinion (BiOp) from the relevant
Service that determines whether the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species.165 There are consequently two decisions
the Services can make that affect an action agency’s ability to proceed with a
project: (1) a concurrence or nonconcurrence in informal consultation, and (2) a
“jeopardy” or “no jeopardy” finding in a BiOp.

159.
160.

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2014).
Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009)). In Karuk Tribe,
the Forest Service approved several dredge mining activities in the Klamath River Basin without engaging
in consultation, explaining that the mining would have no effect on either endangered coho salmon or
coho salmon critical habitat in the area. Id. at 1013. The federal district court did not reach the “may
affect” question, deciding that the Forest Service’s approval of the mining activities did not constitute
“agency action” under the ESA, and a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1017. However,
an en banc Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the Forest Service’s approval was a final agency action, and
that because the mining could affect coho salmon or their habitat, the activities met the “may affect”
threshold. Id. at 1029; but see Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 811 (8th Cir. 1998)
(upholding the Forest Service’s conclusion that timber sales and associated road construction would have
no effect on listed bald eagles).
161. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2014); see also Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of
1973, as Amended; Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986) (“The threshold for formal consultation
must be set sufficiently low to allow Federal agencies to satisfy their duty to ‘insure’ under section 7(a)(2).
Therefore, the burden is on the Federal agency to show the absence of likely, adverse effects to listed
species or critical habitat as a result of its proposed action in order to be excepted from the formal
consultation obligation.”).
162. The agency either analyzes potential effects in a biological assessment if the action also
qualifies as a “major construction activity” under NEPA, 50 C.F.R. § 492.12 (2015), or by way of informal
communications with the Services. Id. § 402.13 (2015).
163. Id. § 402.14(b)(1).
164. Id. § 402.14(a).
165. Id. § 402.14(g)(4).
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The Effect of Informal Consultation

Because the Services must concur with an action agency’s “not likely to
adversely affect” decision, the Services have the final say on whether to proceed
to formal consultation. The fact that action agencies must obtain their
concurrence makes the Services’ role under the ESA more powerful than
consulting agencies under the NHPA, whose concurrence is not required.166
Moreover, even if the relevant Service concurs with a not likely to adversely
affect decision, action agencies must reinitiate consultation under certain
circumstances.167
The requirement that the Services concur with the action agency during
informal consultation gives them significant leverage. Because of the time and
resource costs of preparing a BiOp under formal consultation, action agencies
strongly prefer to stick to informal consultation. The threat of having to engage
in formal consultation and wait for a BiOp gives the Services the ability to trade
their concurrence for changes in the design of the project.168 Thus, what seems
like a purely procedural requirement can in fact produce substantive project
changes. This ability to affect substance through process makes the ESA quite
similar to NEPA and the NHPA.169
Given the Services’ leverage, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Bush
administration twice unsuccessfully attempted to eliminate the need for a Service
concurrence by promulgating “counterpart” regulations.170 In 2003, as a part of
the Healthy Forests Initiative,171 the Services sought to allow “alternative
consultation agreements”172 to satisfy the section 7 consultation requirement for

166. Under the NHPA, consultation may always be “terminated,” and the action agency can proceed
once it has received an advisory comment from the Council. Although action agencies in practice will
seek to avoid this outcome, see supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text, the concurrence is
nevertheless inconclusive under the NHPA. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
167. The effect of a concurrence concludes an action agency’s ESA obligations only as long as (1)
no “new information reveals effects of the action that may affect listed species or critical habitat in a
manner or to an extent not previously considered,” (2) there is not modification to the action “that causes
an effect to the listed species or critical habitat that was not considered . . . .”, and (3) no “new species is
listed or critical habitat designated that may be affected by the identified action.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b)–
(d) (2014). Although by its terms this regulation applies only to formal consultation, the Ninth Circuit
applied it to informal consultation in Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 2006)
(requiring the Forest Service to reinitiate consultation because it failed to adhere to criteria established
during informal consultation).
168. See Daniel J. Rohlf, The Endangered Species Act at Forty: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
20 ANIMAL L. 251, 265–66 (2014).
169. See supra Parts II (NEPA) and III (NHPA).
170. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (2014).
171. WHITE HOUSE, HEALTHY FORESTS: AN INITIATIVE FOR WILDFIRE PREVENTION AND
STRONGER COMMUNITIES (2002), http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/HealthyForests_Pres_Policy
%20A6_v2.pdf; see generally Jesse B. Davis, The Healthy Forests Initiative: Unhealthy Policy Choices
in Forest and Fire Management, 34 ENVTL. L. 1209 (2004).
172. Under an alternative consultation agreement, as long as action agencies receive training
adequate to make “not likely to adversely affect” determinations, the Services could allow the action
agency to make that decision.
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actions under the National Fire Plan.173 Then, less than a year later, the Services
attempted to promulgate regulations that would have allowed EPA and the
Department of Agriculture to use alternative consultation agreements for actions
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).174 Both
sets of regulations would have authorized action agencies to make a unilateral
not likely to adversely affect determination under certain circumstances,175
removing the need for a concurrence from the Services.
Courts struck down both sets of regulations. In 2006’s Washington Toxics
Coalition v. U.S. Department of the Interior, a federal district court decided that
the FIFRA regulations were inconsistent with the plain language of the ESA.176
The court explained that because “the ‘in consultation with’ language [in the
ESA] is paired with ‘with the assistance of the Secretary,’ . . . [a not likely to
adversely affect] determination is not to be unilaterally made.”177 Six years later,
in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, the federal district court for the District of
Columbia struck down the National Fire Plan’s counterpart regulations, although
on narrower grounds.178 The administration had justified the regulations on the
ground that the length of consultation for important fire-related projects
“encumbered” action agencies. But the court decided that the adoption of the
regulations was arbitrary because “[t]here [was] no explanation in the
Regulations as to how the biologists . . . [were] being ‘encumbered’; [and] no
examples of instances in which Fire Plan projects were delayed because of the
‘encumbrances’ that biologists faced in deciding whether to concur.”179
These two decisions leave the fate of future attempts to create counterpart
regulations unclear. The ESA’s implementing regulations still authorize
counterpart regulations,180 but even these provisions may not survive judicial
review. If a reviewing court adopts the Washington Toxics court’s interpretation
of the language of the ESA consultation requirements,181 it will likely strike
down future attempts to give decision-making authority entirely over to an action
agency. On the other hand, if a court were to take the Defenders of Wildlife
approach, the agencies may be able to rationally justify counterpart regulations
in order to avoid delays in project approvals due to wildlife agency
173. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,254 (Dec. 8, 2003) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402, subpt. C).
174. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg.
47,732 (Aug. 5, 2004) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402, subpt. D).
175. The FIFRA counterpart regulations allowed alternative consultation agreements for
discretionary EPA actions under FIFRA. 50 C.F.R. § 402.42(a) (2014). The Healthy Forest regulations
authorized such agreements for National Fire Plan projects. 50 C.F.R. § 402.33(a) (2014).
176. 457 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
177. Id. at 1179.
178. 842 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-5111, 2012 WL 2371618 (D.C.
Cir. June 21, 2012).
179. Id. at 186. An additional reason the court gave for striking down the 2003 regulations was that
they failed to define what constitutes a “National Fire Plan project.” Id. at 187.
180. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (2014).
181. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
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concurrences.182 These failed regulatory efforts underscore the importance of the
Services’ concurrence authority —the mere threat of formal consultation gives
them considerable influence over the ESA process.
C.

The Effect of Formal Consultation

Formal consultation concludes when the relevant Service issues a BiOp that
determines whether the action agency’s proposal will jeopardize the continued
existence of a listed species. The Service’s jeopardy determination imposes one
of two sets of duties on the action agency depending on whether or not the
Service finds “jeopardy.”
1.

The Effect of a “No Jeopardy” Finding

A Service’s “no jeopardy” finding does not conclude an action agency’s
ESA obligations. Because the statute leaves the final responsibility for ESA
compliance with the action agency, not the Services,183 an action agency’s
decision to rely on a “no jeopardy” BiOp must not be arbitrary and capricious.184
Courts have made clear that an action agency may not “simply rubber stamp . . .
the [Service]’s analysis.”185 At the same time, however, an action agency “need
not undertake a separate, independent analysis.”186 In fact, according to the Ninth
Circuit, “even when the [Service’s] opinion is based on ‘admittedly weak’
information, another agency’s reliance on that opinion will satisfy its obligations
under the ESA if a challenging party can point to no ‘new’ information.”187
Consequently, although the action agency has ultimate responsibility for ESA
compliance, a “no jeopardy” finding by the relevant Service is strong evidence
that a project will comply with the ESA.
182.
183.

See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (“The agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance
of [the Services], insure that any action . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of [a listed]
species.” (emphasis added)).
184. City of Tacoma v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (ruling
FERC’s reliance on a “no jeopardy” BiOp was not arbitrary or capricious because it had no additional
information that the Service did not have, and “expert agencies are in the best position to make
discretionary factual determinations about whether a proposed agency action will create a problem for a
listed species and what measures might be appropriate to protect the species.”); see also Dow
AgroSciences L.L.C. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 637 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2011) (“When a court
of appeals reviews the EPA’s reliance on a BiOp, it . . . determine[s] . . . whether the EPA’s reliance was
arbitrary and capricious.”).
185. Aluminum Co. of America v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999);
see Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A
federal agency cannot abrogate its responsibility to ensure that its actions will not jeopardize a listed
species; its decision to rely on a FWS [BiOp] must not have been arbitrary or capricious.”).
186. Aluminum Co., 175 F.3d at 1161 (rejecting an industry challenge to the Bonneville Power
Administration’s reliance on a NMFS “jeopardy” BiOp and deciding that reliance on a “jeopardy” BiOp
should receive the same judicial deference on review as reliance on a “no jeopardy” BiOp).
187. Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d at 1415; see City of Tacoma, 460 F.3d. at 76 (adopting the Pyramid
Lake court’s interpretation and applying it to conclude that FERC reasonably relied on a FWS BiOp
because the challenging party presented no new information).
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The Effect of a “Jeopardy” Finding

From a strictly legal perspective, the effect of a “jeopardy” finding on an
action agency’s ability to continue a project is similar to that of a “no jeopardy”
finding. When an action agency relies on a Service’s “jeopardy” finding, a
reviewing court will apply the same standard as for a “no jeopardy” finding,188
meaning that an action agency need not conduct its own independent review to
determine if the jeopardy analysis is accurate.189 As long as no party presents
new information, an action agency may properly rely on the Service’s finding.190
From a practical perspective a “jeopardy” finding is quite different—action
agencies have a difficult time proceeding with a project. Writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear, Justice Scalia proclaimed that “jeopardy”
findings are “virtually determinative” and that while a BiOp “theoretically serves
an ‘advisory function,’ in reality it has a powerful coercive effect on the action
agency.”191 Thus while the ESA technically places final decision-making
authority in the action agency’s hands,192 in practice it may be impossible to
articulate sufficient reasons for disregarding the expert Service’s BiOp to survive
judicial review.193 BiOps’ virtually determinative effect under the ESA therefore
appears to give the Services a much larger substantive role in decision making
than their counterpart expert agencies have under NEPA and the NHPA.
Although all three statutes rely on judicial review (or the threat of it) to affect
action agency decisions, the likelihood that a court will side with the expert
agency appears greater under the ESA than the other two statutes.
IV. THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S SECTION 404(C) EPA VETO
Unlike the three statutes examined above, section 404(c) of the CWA gives
direct decision-making power to an expert agency, EPA, in the context of permits
issued by the Corps. This Part first explains the dynamics of the EPA’s authority
under section 404(c) to veto Corps-issued permits for the discharge of dredged
or fill material, and then discusses the limits of that authority. It then explains
how the CWA’s delegation of final decision-making authority gives EPA more
power to affect an action agency’s decisions than any of the statutes explored so
far.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Aluminum Co., 175 F.3d at 1161.
Id.
Id.
520 U.S. 154, 169–70 (1997) (ruling that the plaintiffs had standing because their injuries were
fairly traceable to the FWS due to the coercive effects of BiOps on action agencies).
192. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
193. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169–70.
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The Scope of the EPA’s CWA Section 404 Veto Authority

Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Corps to issue permits194 “for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites.”195 However, EPA has authority to veto Corps permits if it
determines that the discharge in question “will have an unacceptable adverse
effect on . . . water suppl[y], [fish and] wildlife, or recreation.”196 The statute on
its face clearly gives EPA the last word on the Corps’ permitting, although EPA
vetoes are subject to public notice and comment, as well as consultation with the
Corps.197 The courts have also broadly interpreted both why EPA may veto
section 404(c) permits and when it may do so, although they have raised
questions about the breadth of the CWA’s jurisdiction, which may affect where
EPA’s veto authority applies in future.198
Courts have consistently deferred to EPA on the factors it may consider in
its section 404(c) veto decisions.199 Since section 404(c)’s “unacceptable
adverse effects” standard includes no statutory definition, EPA has relied on
section 404(b)(1)’s guidelines,200 which the CWA requires the Corps to use in
issuing permits.201 However, EPA is not required, as the Corps is,202 to balance

194. The statute also authorizes EPA to grant states section 404 permitting authority for waters that
are not traditionally navigable if the state meets certain requirements, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)–(h) (2012),
although only Michigan and New Jersey have assumed this authority. 40 C.F.R. §§ 233.70, 233.71 (2015).
195. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The statute exempts discharges from “normal farming,
silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for
the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices.” Id. §
1344(f)(1)(A). A 2014 guidance document issued by the Corps and EPA attempted to interpret the “normal
farming” exception, but Congress intervened, ordering the agencies to withdraw it in the 2015
Appropriations Act. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113235, § 112, 128 Stat. 2129, 2308 (2014).
196. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). For a brief history of the implementation of section 404, see Amy Oxley,
No Longer Mine: An Extensive Look at the Environmental Protection Agency’s Veto of the Section 404
Permit Held by the Spruce No. 1 Mine, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 139, 143–47 (2011).
197. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
198. See supra notes 220–220 and accompanying text.
199. See Michael C. Blumm & Elisabeth D. Mering, Vetoing Wetland Permits Under Section 404(c)
of the Clean Water Act: A History of Inter-Federal Agency Controversy and Reform, 33 U.C.L.A. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2015) (supplying a detailed history of the thirteen section 404(c) vetoes
over the last four decades).
200. The section 404(b)(1) guidelines prohibit the Corps from issuing a section 404 permit when (a)
there is a practicable alternative available that would have a less adverse effect on the ecosystem, (b) the
proposed discharge will violate state water quality standards, toxic effluent standards, the ESA, or fail to
protect marine sanctuaries under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, (c) the proposed discharge will
“cause or contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the United States,” or (d) the applicant has
not taken “appropriate and practicable steps [which would] minimize potential adverse impacts of the
discharge on the aquatic ecosystem” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2015).
201. See Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405, 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that EPA’s decision to rely on section 404(b)(1) guidelines to determine an “unacceptable
adverse effect” under section 404(c) was a reasonable interpretation of the statute).
202. The Corps’ regulations have long imposed a “public interest review” on the agency under which
the “benefits which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal must be balanced against its
reasonably foreseeable detriments.” 33 C.F.R § 320.4 (2015).
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environmental concerns against “public interest” factors that may favor issuing
the permit.203 Thus, while the Corps’ “public interest review” may allow
economics to trump environmental concerns, EPA’s veto power allows it to
overturn the Corps’ permit decisions based solely on environmental concerns.
A related issue is how far EPA’s veto power extends temporally. The D.C.
Circuit addressed this question in 2013’s Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA.204 In
that case, the Corps issued a permit in 2007 to a coal company for fill discharges
in connection with its mountaintop mining operations in West Virginia.205 EPA
did not exercise its veto authority until 2011, four years after the Corps issued
the permit.206 The district court decided that section 404(c) did not authorize
EPA to revoke existing permits,207 but the D.C. Circuit reversed, focusing on the
text of section 404(c), which expressly authorizes EPA to veto “whenever” it
finds an unacceptable adverse effect.208 Consequently, the court concluded that
section 404 “imposes no temporal limit on [EPA’s] authority” to veto a Corps
permit.209
The D.C. Circuit’s decision has led some to wonder whether the EPA
possesses prospective veto power as well.210 Section 404(c)’s regulations have
recognized such vetoes since 1979,211 although the EPA has seldom exercised
this authority. However, EPA appears poised to preemptively veto the
controversial Pebble Mine Project—a proposed gold and copper mine in
Alaska’s Bristol Bay watershed—even though the proponent has yet to file a
permit application. In mid-2014 EPA issued a notice of proposed
determination212 that it would prospectively restrict (veto) discharges associated
with the mine that would result in a loss of streams, a loss of wetlands, lakes or
ponds, or alter streamflow.213 After a public comment period that generated

203. See James City Cnty. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 1336 (4th Cir. 1993) (ruling that EPA did not need
to consider the need of the public for water before vetoing a permit to construct a dam and reservoir, and
may base its veto solely on environmental harms).
204. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1540 (2014).
205. Id. at 610.
206. Id. at 611.
207. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 153 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 714 F.3d 608
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
208. Mingo Logan, 714 F.3d at 613 (emphasis in original) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012)).
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kirschner, EPA’s Clean Water Act Section 404 Veto Authority, 28 NAT. RES.
& ENV’T 54, 54–55 (2013).
211. 40 C.F.R. § 231.1(a) (2015) (“[EPA] may also prohibit the specification of a site under section
404(c) with regard to any existing or potential disposal site before a permit application has been submitted
to or approved by the Corps or a state.”).
212. EPA, Proposed Determination of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 10
Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act: Pebble Deposit Area, Southwest Alaska ES-5–ES-6
(2014).
213. The notice of proposed determination contains numerical limits on the loss of streams,
wetlands, and streamflow alterations. See id.
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some 155,000 comments, the agency promised a decision in 2015,214 although
that decision has been delayed by a preliminary injunction.215 All this has not
gone unnoticed. The threat to the Pebble Mine Project, coupled with the judicial
affirmation of EPA’s veto power in Mingo Logan, has led critics to call on
Congress to amend the CWA to impose a temporal limit on EPA’s veto
authority.216
EPA’s authority extends only as far as the Corps’ CWA jurisdiction—if the
Corps cannot issue a permit, the EPA cannot veto it.217 Still, both agencies take
an expansive view of their jurisdiction. In May 2015 EPA and the Corps
promulgated a definitional rule that categorically includes all tributaries and all
waters adjacent to them as within the CWA’s jurisdiction.218 Although the Corps
and EPA claimed that the rule in fact narrows the scope of CWA jurisdiction by
adding more regulatory exemptions,219 in practice it will likely make it easier for
the Corps and EPA to assert jurisdiction over more areas without having to
undertake a fact-intensive analysis.220 That will save administrative resources,
214. Announcement to Extend the Period to Evaluate Public Comments Received on the Proposed
Determination for the Pebble Deposit Area, Southwest Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 19, 2014).
215. The Alaska federal district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing EPA from making
a final section 404(c) decision until it can rule on a Federal Advisory Committee Act claim. See Bristol
Bay Native Corp., Court Issues Injunction Delaying EPA process on Pebble, PEBBLE WATCH (Nov. 24,
2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.pebblewatch.com/index.php/645-pebble-injunction-upheld-by-federaljudge. The case arose from EPA’s failure to disclose certain information, not a challenge to EPA’s veto
authority generally. If EPA proceeds to exercise its veto authority, the agency will face an almost certain
court challenge as to whether it may veto a project with neither a permit application nor an issued permit.
In fact, the company proposing the mine already challenged EPA’s authority to veto the project, but
because EPA had not yet issued a final determination, the court held there was no “final agency action”
available for judicial review. JOSEPH L. JENKINS ET AL., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA
ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES LAW: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 169 (2014).
216. See, e.g., Oxley, supra note 196, at 140 (“[C]hanges must be made to section 404 to limit the
EPA’s ability to veto existing permits, to encourage the agency to act before a permit is issued, and to
instill trust in the current permitting system.”); Jason Bailey, Clean Water Act, Section 404 Applicants:
May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 457, 485 (2014) (“Congress should provide
additional guidance as to how and when the EPA can invoke its section 404(c) veto power.”). On February
11, 2015, Congressman Bob Gibbs of Ohio introduced a bill that would restrict the EPA’s veto authority
to after the Corps has processed an application and before it issues a final permit. Regulatory Certainty
Act of 2015, H.R. 896, 114th Cong. (2015).
217. The CWA gives the Corps and EPA jurisdiction over “navigable waters,” statutorily defined as
“waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). According to the Supreme Court’s fractured
decision in Rapanos v. United States, wetlands must have a surface connection (according to the plurality
opinion) or a “significant nexus” (Justice Kennedy’s decisive concurrence) to navigable-in-fact waters to
fall within the statute. 547 U.S. 715, 742, 767 (2006). Although the EPA released guidance concerning
how to determine whether a water is jurisdictional, the result of Rapanos is that jurisdictional
determinations often require fact-intensive case-by-case analyses. See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367,
1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Far from providing clarity and predictability, the agency’s latest
informal guidance advises property owners that many jurisdictional determinations concerning wetlands
can only be made on a case-by-case basis by EPA field staff.”).
218. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,058
(June 29, 2015) (amending 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pt. 117).
219. Id. at 37,054.
220. However, a district court in North Dakota has granted a preliminary injunction on enforcement
of the rule in thirteen states, deciding that the EPA likely exceeded its congressional grant of authority in
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so even if the rule does not technically expand the agency’s jurisdiction, it could
shift personnel from making jurisdictional determinations to enforcement,
including use of EPA’s veto authority.
B.

The Effect of the EPA’s Veto Power on Corps Decision Making

The most obvious way for the EPA to affect a Corps permit is to veto it,
thereby prohibiting a permit applicant from discharging dredged or fill material.
This authority gives the EPA the last administrative word on the permit
decision,221 distinguishing section 404(c) from statutes like NEPA, the NHPA,
and the ESA, where the final decision remains in the hands of the action
agency.222
Despite EPA’s apparently broad authority to veto permits, it has exercised
this power only thirteen times in the forty-three years since Congress enacted
section 404, and (somewhat surprisingly) just three times since 1990.223
Nevertheless, the threat of an EPA veto provides leverage akin to that exercised
by the Services in ESA consultation. In fact, a threat under the CWA is likely
more powerful than under the ESA because a section 404(c) veto is actually
determinative, rather than “virtually” so.224 The nearly unconditional nature of
EPA’s veto power may explain why the agency uses it so rarely. Since section
404(c) authority gives the EPA the last word on interpreting the section 404(b)(1)
guidelines, it can affect the Corps’ decisions indirectly, just as expert agencies
do under the ESA and, to some extent, under both NEPA and the NHPA. This
authority gives the EPA considerable influence over the Corps’ decisions to issue
permits and the conditions the Corps includes in them—all without exercising a
veto.225

promulgating it. N. Dakota v. U.S. E.P.A., No. 3:15-CV-59, 2015 WL 5060744, at *1 (D.N.D. Aug. 27,
2015). But even as some states, industry, farmers and ranchers argue that the rule expands CWA
jurisdiction, environmental groups maintain that the rule fails to extend categorical jurisdiction over many
ecologically important wetlands, in particular prairie potholes in the Great Plains, which provide important
habitat for waterfowl in the region. See Annie Snider, Obama Admin Finalizes WOTUS as Stakeholders
Gird
for
Battle,
GREENWIRE
(May
27,
2015),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/05/27/stories/1060019196.
221. See James City Cnty. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 1336 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Ultimately . . . recognizing
the EPA’s expertise and concentrated concern with environmental matters, Congress gave the final
decision whether to permit a project to that agency.”).
222. See supra Parts II (NEPA), III (NHPA), and IV (ESA).
223. See EPA, EPA CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(C) FACT SHEET,
http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/404c.pdf. In fact, almost all of these vetoes took place
between 1980 and 1990. See generally Blumm & Mering, supra note 199.
224. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170, 177 (1997) (finding that under the ESA, although the
decision as to whether an action results in “jeopardy” to a listed species rests in the hands of the action
agency, a Service “jeopardy” finding is “virtually determinative” in judicial review of the action agency’s
decision).
225. See Kim Diana Connolly, STEPHEN M. JOHNSON & DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS, WETLANDS LAW
AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 284 (2006); see also Blumm & Mering, supra note 199.
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EPA’s ability to veto permits retroactively, ratified in Mingo Logan,226
underscores the agency’s authority to exert oversight over discharges even after
the Corps has issued a section 404 permit.227 Coupled with EPA’s significant
leverage over actions it does not veto, the agency’s veto power confers more
substantive decision-making authority than any of the other expert agencies
discussed above. Additionally, because EPA may make its veto decisions
without considering economic factors228 this dynamic allows for more
environmentally sensitive decision making.
V. CONDITIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
The FPA authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
issue nonfederal hydropower licenses on navigable waters.229 The FPA,
originally an achievement of the Progressive Conservation Era,230 gives resource
agencies such as federal land managers and fishery agencies the ability to issue
conditions, prescriptions, and recommendations under three different
provisions.231 This Part explains each of these issues, analyzing the effect of
expert agency participation on FERC licensing.
A.

Federal Land Manager Conditioning Authority Under Section 4(e)

Section 4(e) of the FPA authorizes federal land managers to issue conditions
attached to nonfederal hydropower licenses in order to adequately protect the

226.
227.

See supra notes 205–209 and accompanying text.
For example, during the four years between the Corps’ issuance of the permit to Mingo Logan
Coal and EPA’s veto, EPA sent a letter to the Corps requesting that it “suspend, revoke, or modify” Mingo
Logan’s permit based on “new information and circumstances . . . which justify reconsideration of the
permit.’” Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 608, 610–11 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1540 (2014) (quoting Letter from EPA Region III to U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Huntington Dist. at 1
(Sept. 3, 2009)). The Corps responded that it would not do so, possibly because it did not think EPA had
the power to veto permits after issuance. However, now that the D.C. Circuit has confirmed that EPA
possesses retroactive veto authority, similar letters may convince the Corps to modify existing permits.
228. See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
229. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012).
230. The 1920 FPA was a victory for Progressive Conservationists who wanted federal control of
important hydroelectric resources over utilities and resource rich states that wanted to retain control. See,
e.g., D. H. Cole, Reviving the Federal Power Act’s Comprehensive Plan Requirement: A History of
Neglect and Prospects for the Future, 16 ENVTL. L. 639, 653 (1986); see generally SAMUEL P. HAYS,
CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT
1890–1920 (1959).
231. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Vickie A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and
the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81 (2001).
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federal “reservation”232 upon or within which a hydropower project is located.233
As the case law discussed below demonstrates, section 4(e) authority is broad
enough to grant land managers real decision-making power. And, although this
provision’s authority is geographically limited to licensed projects on
reservations, land managers have considerable discretion in their exercise of that
power within that arena.
The seminal court interpretation of section 4(e) was the Supreme Court’s
1984 decision in Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual,
Pauma, & Pala Bands of Mission Indians,234 which clarified the effect of federal
land manager conditions, as well as the geographical limits of that authority. In
Escondido, several Indian tribes challenged FERC’s reissuance of a license to
continue operation of a dam and canal on and near several Indian reservations.235
The dam and canal diverted the San Luis Rey River to provide water to the San
Diego County cities of Vista and Escondido, depriving the reservations of
water.236 The federal land manager, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, proposed a
series of conditions in order to protect the reservations’ use of water,237 but
FERC issued the license without most of the conditions, believing that the FPA
did not require their inclusion.238 The tribes contested the license, arguing the
plain language of the statute—that licenses “shall be subject to and contain such
conditions as the [federal land manager] shall deem necessary for the adequate
protection and utilization of such reservation”239—required FERC to accept,
without modification, the federal land manager’s conditions.240 The Supreme
Court agreed with the tribes, ruling that “[t]he mandatory nature of the language
chosen by Congress appears to require that [FERC] include the [land manager’s]
conditions in the license even if it disagrees with them.”241 Thus, the Court

232. The FPA defines “reservations” to include “national forests, tribal lands embraced within
Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United
States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public land
laws.” 16 U.S.C. § 796(2) (2012). The Department of Interior Office of the Solicitor has concluded that
the definition includes BLM lands (because they have been reserved from disposal since the 1930s) even
though BLM lands generally have no reserved water rights. See GEORGE COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL
PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES LAW 622 (7th ed. 2014) (citing a 2001 Solicitor’s Opinion).
233. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (“[L]icenses shall be issued within any reservation only after a finding by
the Commission that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such
reservation was created or acquired, and shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary
of the department under whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the adequate
protection and utilization of such reservation.”). This language was included in the original 1920 Federal
Water Power Act, Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920).
234. 466 U.S. 765 (1984).
235. Id. at 769.
236. Id. at 767–68.
237. Id. at 770.
238. Id.
239. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012).
240. Escondido, 466 U.S. at 779.
241. Id. at 772
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decided that FERC had to include federal land managers’ conditions in its
licenses.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language
“within any reservation” to impose geographical limits on land managers’
section 4(e) conditioning authority. Although three of the reservations at issue in
Escondido contained physical elements of the hydropower project, the other
three did not.242 The licensee argued that the statute authorized land manager
conditions only for licenses “within” reservations.243 The Supreme Court agreed
and, reversing the Ninth Circuit, decided that “within” meant that the project
must be physically within the reservation boundaries.244
At least one court since Escondido has interpreted the decision to give
federal land managers broad authority over hydroelectric licensing if any part of
a project lies within a federal reservation. In City of Tacoma v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit ruled that even a small part of a
hydropower project, such as power lines or access roads, triggers section 4(e)
conditioning authority.245 In addition, the court upheld land manager conditions
that were not even specifically related to the power line or access road but
concerned the project as a whole, including any condition “reasonably related to
protecting the reservation.”246 Thus, as long as some part of the project touches
part of a reservation, federal land managers have the authority to impose
mandatory license conditions on hydropower projects.
Also at issue in City of Tacoma was the timing of federal land managers’
ability to impose conditions on the Cushman Project, a major hydroelectric
project on the Skokomish River in Washington.247 Similar to the Mingo Logan
404(c) veto case,248 FERC had attempted to put a time limit on land managers’
conditioning authority,249 arguing that because the agencies exceeded that time
limit for the Cushman Project, it need not include the conditions. But the D.C.
242.
243.

Id. at 788.
Id. at 780; see 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (“[L]icenses shall be issued within any reservation . . . and
shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the department under whose supervision
such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of such
reservation.”) (emphasis added)).
244. Escondido, 466 U.S. at 784.
245. City of Tacoma v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(interpreting the Supreme Court’s statement in Escondido that “[i]t is clear that Congress concluded that
reservations were not entitled to the added protection provided by the proviso of § 4(e) unless some of the
licensed works were actually within the reservation,” to mean that “‘some’ means ‘some’; it does not
mean ‘all,’ or even ‘a lot.’”).
246. Id. at 67.
247. Id. at 59, 64; see 18 C.F.R. § 3.34(b) (2015) (“All comments (including mandatory . . . terms
and conditions or prescriptions) on an application for . . . [a] license must be filed with the Commission
no later than 60 days after issuance by the Commission of public notice.”).
248. See supra notes 204–209 and accompanying text.
249. 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(b) (“All comments (including mandatory and recommended terms and
conditions or prescriptions) on an application for exemption or license must be filed with the Commission
no later than 60 days after issuance by the Commission of public notice declaring that the application is
ready for environmental analysis.”).
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Circuit decided that the attempt to impose an administrative time limit exceeded
FERC’s statutory authority, stating that “[t]hough FERC makes the final decision
as to whether to issue a license, FERC shares its authority to impose license
conditions with other federal agencies.”250 In so ruling, the court recognized that
licensing under the FPA established a shared decision-making paradigm among
federal land managers and FERC.251
Consequently, section 4(e) of the FPA, like section 404(c) of the CWA,
explicitly recognizes shared decision-making power. Unlike NEPA, the NHPA,
and the ESA, where the expert agency can only indirectly affect the action
agency’s decision through judicial review or the threat thereof, the FPA
affirmatively delegates decision-making authority to land managers. The FPA
seems similar to section 404(c), where EPA faces a binary choice to either veto
or not veto a Corps permit. By contrast, FPA land managers can affect licensing
decisions in many different ways, since any conditions they promulgate must
appear in the FERC license. Put otherwise, these agencies can directly alter the
construction of licensed projects. However, just as the jurisdictional prerequisite
of “waters of the United States” limits EPA’s CWA vetoes, the geographical
boundaries of federal reservations confine land managers’ section 4(e)
conditioning authority.
B.

Federal Fishery Manager Conditioning Authority Under Section 18

Section 18 of the FPA authorizes federal fishery managers to prescribe
“fishways,” usually fish ladders aiding upstream passage but also including
downstream passage devices, at licensed projects.252 Although Congress
established section 18 authority nearly a century ago in 1920,253 the provision
was a sleeper until 1999, when, in American Rivers v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the Ninth Circuit used Escondido’s reasoning to decide that section
18 prescriptions, like section 4(e) conditions, are mandatory.254

250.
251.

City of Tacoma, 460 F.3d at 65.
However, the power to issue conditions is not unconfined. Land managers’ conditions must be
“reasonably related to [the goal of adequate protection and utilization of reservations], otherwise
consistent with the FPA, and supported by substantial evidence.” Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla,
Rincon, San Pasqual, Pauma, & Pala Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 778 (1984). Judicial
challenges must be filed in the federal courts of appeal. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (2012).
252. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (“[FERC] shall require the construction,
maintenance, and operation by a licensee at its own expense of . . . such fishways as may be prescribed by
the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate.”). After some controversy, see
Blumm & Nadol, supra note 231, at 109, in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 Congress defined a “fishway”
as “limited to physical structures, facilities, or devices necessary to maintain all life stages of such fish,
and project operations and measures related to such structures, facilities, or devices which are necessary
to ensure the effectiveness of such structures, facilities, or devices for such fish.” Energy Policy Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1701(b), 106 Stat. 2776, 3008.
253. See Federal Water Power Act, Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 811).
254. 201 F.3d 1186, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999).
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In American Rivers, environmentalists challenged FERC’s decision to
relicense several hydropower facilities on the McKenzie River in Oregon
because the agency failed to include prescriptions submitted by fishery
managers.255 FERC maintained that because it had fully explained its reasoning
for rejecting the prescriptions, it had no duty to include them in the license.256
The Ninth Circuit, echoing Escondido, ruled that section 18 contains “a clear
congressional delegation” of authority to federal fishery managers.257
Moreover, the American Rivers court rejected FERC’s attempt to
“reclassify” mandatory section 18 prescriptions as non-mandatory
recommendations.258 Specifically, FERC argued that the Services’
prescriptions259 issued under section 18 were not actually “fishway
prescriptions,” and therefore could be rejected as nonbinding section 10(j)
recommendations.260 But the Ninth Circuit determined that FERC “may not
modify, reject, or reclassify any prescriptions submitted by the [Services] under
color of section 18. Where FERC disagrees with the scope of a fishway
prescription, it may withhold a license altogether or voice its concerns in the
court of appeals . . . .”261 Thus, section 18 prescriptions constitute another
affirmative delegation of decision-making authority to expert agencies, one
reviewable only by a court of appeal, not by FERC.262
C.

Recommendations to Protect Fish and Wildlife Under Section 10(j)

Section 10(j) of the FPA authorizes the federal Services and their state
counterparts (collectively “fishery agencies”) to make recommendations to
FERC to “protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance fish and wildlife” affected
by licensed hydropower projects.263 Unlike section 18 or section 4(e), section
10(j) governs recommendations involving project operations rather than physical
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1210; see supra notes 263–271 and accompanying text.
The prescriptions FERC rejected, all of which involved structures rather than project
operations, included “imposition of fish mortality standards at the fish screens of Leaburg and Walterville
and at the Leaburg rollgates; construction of tailrace barriers; delays in raising the Leaburg Lake water
level; delays in the construction of diversion structures at Walterville; salvage of fish prior to any new
construction at Walterville’s tailrace; annual inspection of the Walterville tailrace; agency control over
final design and monitoring of fishways; and agency enforcement of the licensee’s duty to maintain
fishways in efficient operating condition “American Rivers, 201 F.3d at 1192 n.11.
260. Id. at 1192.
261. Id. at 1210. The FPA gives jurisdiction over judicial review of FERC licenses to “the United
States Court of Appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the [license] relates
is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (2012).
262. See City of Tacoma v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53, 59, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Like section 4(e) land-manager conditions, fishery agency prescriptions must be consistent with the law
and supported by substantial evidence. Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
363 F.3d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
263. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j) (2012).
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structures. Under it, if FERC does not include the fishery agencies’
recommendations as conditions of the relicensing, FERC must publish findings
that the recommendations would be inconsistent with the FPA’s purposes and
that the conditions FERC has included would adequately protect, mitigate, and
enhance fish and wildlife.264 In American Rivers, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that “[s]ection 10(j) and section 4(e), the provision at issue in Escondido, set
forth very different roles for [FERC] to play in the hydropower relicensing
process,” concluding that section 10(j) does not confer final conditioning
authority on resource agencies.265 Section 10(j) is therefore more like NEPA, the
NHPA, and the ESA, which reserve final decision-making authority for the
action agency.
For example, in Idaho Rivers United v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, fishery agencies recommended that five licensed hydroelectric
dams on the Snake River not create reservoirs for future power generation, but
instead let the river run free.266 Fishery agencies issued these recommendations
under section 10(j), not section 18, because they involved project operations
rather than physical structures. When FERC declined to include these
recommendations in its license conditions, environmentalists sued. The Ninth
Circuit upheld FERC’s decision not to include fishery agencies’ section 10(j)
recommendations because FERC had adequately explained its reasoning for not
including them,267 illustrating that even though fishery agency recommendations
play an important role in judicial review, section 10(j) leaves final decisionmaking authority with the action agency, in sharp contrast to both sections 18
and 4(e).268
Nevertheless, as in the case of expert agency consultation or comment under
NEPA, the NHPA, or the ESA, American Rivers recognized that FERC must
afford “significant deference” to fishery agencies’ recommendations under
section 10(j).269 In fact, the statute contemplates that FERC “shall attempt to
resolve any . . . inconsistency [between fishery agencies’ recommendations and
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
American Rivers, 201 F.3d at 1203–04.
189 F. App’x 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 633. The court determined that FERC’s failure to incorporate specific measures to protect
sturgeon pending the licensee’s submission of a sturgeon conservation plan (due within one year of license
issuance) was not unreasonable, noting that sturgeon were not listed under the ESA, and that the license
would maintain current levels of fish protection and water quality and proceed with habitat
improvements. Id at 635–36.
268. CWA section 401 likewise gives final decision-making authority to states concerning
conditions necessary to maintain state water quality standards for federal permits that may result in
discharges to navigable waters (e.g. hydropower projects). 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). States must certify
these projects before FERC may license them, and the Supreme Court has recognized that such
certifications can include conditions related to minimum stream flow requirements necessary to protect a
fishery. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712 (1994). FERC is
obligated to include such conditions, regardless of whether it thinks they are reasonably related to water
quality. American Rivers, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 129 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1997).
269. Id. at 1205 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kelley ex rel. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 96 F.3d 1482, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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FPA purposes and requirements], giving due weight to the recommendations,
expertise, and statutory responsibilities of such agencies.”270 Thus, for FERC to
reject a fishery agency’s recommendations, it must adequately explain, with the
requisite deference to the expert agency, its reasons for doing so.
D.

The Effect of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on Conditioning Authority

In 2005 Congress significantly amended the FPA with the Energy Policy
Act (EPAct), which added procedures that have affected the process by which
resource agencies271 exercise their FERC license-conditioning authority.272 The
EPAct273 left the decision-making structure of the FPA intact, but amended
sections 4(e) and 18 to permit parties to relicensing proceedings to request “trialtype hearings” and allow licensees to propose alternative conditions and
prescriptions.274
The EPAct allows any party to relicensing proceedings to request an up to
ninety day trial-type hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in order
to resolve disputed issues of material fact related to conditions or
prescriptions.275 The apparent goal of the amendments was to allow licensees to
require the development of a more complete administrative record, particularly
documentation of the reasons supporting the mandatory conditions of expert
fishery agencies. However, a 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report determined that in the five years following the EPAct’s passage, only three
hearings out of a total of 103 eligible projects—less than three percent—
produced an ALJ decision.276 Licensees requested hearings for only eighteen
projects, most of which resulted in a settlement agreement.277 Of the issues

270.
271.

16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(2).
Resource agencies include federal land managers under section 4(e) and fishery agencies under
sections 18 and 10(j).
272. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 811 (2012).
273. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
274. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 811, 823d (2012).
275. Id. §§ 797(e), 811. The amendments directed the resource agencies to promulgate rules
establishing procedures for these trial-type hearings, which the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
and Interior did the same year. Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in
Hydropower Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804 (Nov. 17, 2005). The regulations require the resource agency
to first file its proposed conditions or prescriptions with FERC, along with the supporting rationale. 7
C.F.R. § 1.620 (2015). Within thirty days of the initial filing, any party to the relicensing can request a
hearing before an ALJ. Id. § 1.621. To do so, the party must identify a disputed issue of material fact and
provide a list of witnesses and exhibits. Id. The resource agency has fifty-five days from the initial filing
deadline (of the proposed conditions) to respond, provide its own list of witnesses and exhibits, consolidate
hearings with substantially similar disputes, and refer the case to the ALJ. Id. §§ 1.624–1.626. The
discovery period, hearing, and final decision all must take place within 120 days of the referral notice. Id.
§ 1.660.
276. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-770, Hydropower Relicensing: Stakeholders Views
on the Energy Policy Act Varied, But More Consistent Information Needed (2010),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-770.
277. Id. at 13.
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decided in the three hearings that resulted in an ALJ decision, the majority of the
findings favored the resource agency, not the licensee.278
Despite ALJs’ tendency to rule in a resource agency’s favor, the statutory
authorization of hearings may have the effect of producing more favorable
conditions for licensees. This is likely because trial-type hearings are expensive
and time consuming; agencies estimate that the three hearings between 2005 and
2010 cost $3.1 million.279 In GAO interviews with various stakeholders about
the new trial-type hearings, the licensees explained that resource agencies were
more willing to negotiate potential conditions and prescriptions to avoid requests
for trial-type hearings.280 Many resource agency officials thought that the threat
of expensive trial-type hearings pressured them to issue agreeable conditions and
produced less favorable conditions.281 Thus, even though licensees infrequently
requested hearings, the threat of them may significantly affect resource agency’s
decisions concerning appropriate FPA conditions and prescriptions.
The EPAct also added section 33 to the FPA, which enables licensees to
propose alternative conditions to the resource agencies.282 The GAO found that
licensees proposed alternative conditions in only 24 percent of relicensing
proceedings between 2005 and 2010—all of which were rejected.283 Yet the
GAO also found that agencies modified many of their original conditions in
settlement negotiations with the licensees.284 Although the resource agencies
explained why they rejected the proposed alternatives, they did not say why the
settlement negotiations resulted in modified final conditions.285 The answer may
have been a desire to avoid the time and expense of writing a formal written
statement upon rejection of a licensee’s proposed condition. In other words,
resource agencies may have traded more favorable conditions for the licensee’s

278. In those three hearings, the parties raised thirty-seven separate issues of material fact to the
ALJs. ALJs ruled for the agency on twenty-give of those issues, for the licensee on six, and split decisions
for the remaining six. Id. at 13. Despite the number of issues decided against the licensee, apparently no
licensees challenged any of the findings in these administrative trial-type hearings in court.
279. Id. at 16.
280. Id. at 14.
281. Id. at 16.
282. 16 U.S.C. § 823d(a) (2012). Section 33 allows licensees to offer alternative prescriptions to
those offered under section 18. Id. § 823d(b). The procedures are the same for alternative section 18
prescriptions as they are for section 4(e) conditions. Section 33 requires the secretary of the relevant
resource agency to determine if the licensee’s proposed alternative condition is either less costly or results
in more electrical productivity than the Secretary’s condition. Id. § 823d(a)(2), (b)(2). The agency then
may submit either its original condition or the proposed alternative to FERC, along with an explanation
of the basis for its decision. Id. § 823d(a)(4), (b)(4). FERC may refer the dispute to its Dispute Resolution
Service instead of automatically accepting the conditions, if it determines that the conditions would be
inconsistent with the purposes of the FPA. Id. § 823d(a)(5), (b)(5). Nevertheless, the opinion of the
Dispute Resolution Service is only advisory, and the resource agency may chose not to accept FERC’s
recommendations. Id. § 823d(a)(5), (b)(5).
283. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 276, at 7.
284. Id. at 12. It does not appear that any of the proposed alternatives resulted in a referral to FERC’s
Dispute Resolution Service.
285. Id.
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agreement to withdraw proposed alternatives.286 It seems that the proponents of
EPAct achieved their objectives of reducing the economic effects of resource
agency conditioning authority by given licensees the leverage to negotiate better
terms.
Although the EPAct left the FPA’s structure for mandatory conditions
intact, the amendments threaten to produce fewer protective hydroelectric license
conditions.287 The threat of trial-type hearings and the potential drain of
resources may be pressuring agency officials into settling with licensees to
modify conditions. And, as the 2010 GAO report concluded, the ensuing
settlements lack transparency because agencies do not explain how and why the
proposed alternatives are as effective as those originally proposed.288 However,
despite the fact that the new procedures appeared to at least indirectly favor the
licensees, the licensees invoked the additional procedure in only 25 of the 103
relicensing proceedings between 2005 and 2010—less than one-quarter of the
total.289 Moreover, at least as of 2010, the use of the procedures appears to be
declining.290
VI. SHARED SOVEREIGNTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING
The shared sovereignty policy reflected in the statutes analyzed in this
Article tends to produce more environmentally protective decision making.
Under NEPA, comments from expert agencies—usually urging closer
consideration of the environmental effects of their proposed actions—not only
influence judicial review but also action agency proposals and frequently result
in altered projects.291 Similarly, NHPA consultation with states, tribes, and the
Council often results in more properties being identified as historic292 and
encourages action agencies to ensure that their actions have no adverse effects
on such properties.293
The shared sovereignty principle reflected in the ESA has produced
decisions that protect listed species because the Services can and do use their
concurrence authority to leverage environmentally protective changes to projects
during informal consultation,294 or to effectively prohibit projects that jeopardize
listed species or destroy critical habitat.295 Under the CWA, EPA’s veto power
has led to environmentally protective decisions because of the leverage it confers
and because, unlike the Corps, EPA can make decisions based solely on

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 9.
See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82–118 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130–147 and accompanying text.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text.
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environmental concerns without considering economic factors.296 Finally, under
the FPA’s brand of shared sovereignty, resource managers can require
nonfederal hydropower licenses to include conditions or prescriptions that
protect fish and federal lands.297
Since shared sovereignty decision making often produces more
environmentally protective results and absorbs more time and administrative
resources, it is perhaps unsurprising that these provisions can prove contentious.
For example, agencies often attempt to avoid NEPA requirements by
categorically excluding whole types of projects from NEPA procedure.298 More
concerning, shared sovereignty decision making often comes under fire from
members of Congress and administrations. The Bush administration’s attempt to
promulgate counterpart ESA regulations was an effort to undermine the shared
decision making established by section 7’s consultation procedures.299 And
while these attempts to undermine the shared sovereignty paradigm proved
unsuccessful, they may portend future efforts to avoid sharing decision-making
power—the existing ESA regulations still authorize future counterpart
regulations.300
Perhaps fearful of the kind of direct decision-making power expert agencies
wield under the CWA and the FPA, Congress has also made efforts to confine
that power. Under the CWA, Congress is currently considering a bill that would
temporally limit EPA’s ability to veto Corps permits, so that the EPA could not
veto permits until after the Corps issues a final permit.301 Moreover, Congress
has already succeeded in somewhat undermining the shared decision making
under the FPA by passing the EPAct, which subjects expert resource managers’
prescriptions and conditions to trial-type hearings.302 Although the EPAct
procedures are not often invoked, they can and have led to less environmentally
protective conditions.303
On the other hand, Congress and the agencies have also acted to preserve or
expand shared sovereignty dynamics under several of these statutes. For
example, under the NHPA, Congress in 1992 recognized the expertise of tribes
in identifying historic properties, adding them as required consulting parties
under the NHPA.304 And one explanation for the relative dearth of CWA vetoes
over the last two decades is that the Corps has learned from experience that it
must defer to EPA, at least on the most controversial fill proposals.305 Shared
sovereignty may be an acquired characteristic of administrative law.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 232–262 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12.
See supra notes 170–180 and accompanying text.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271–275 and accompanying text.
See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224–225 and accompanying text; see also Blumm & Mering, supra note 199.
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CONCLUSION
The principle of shared sovereignty is deeply embedded in environmental
law. Save for the FPA in the Progressive Conservation Era, Congress enacted all
of the statutes examined in this Article between 1966 and 1973.306 Over the
ensuing decades they have become firmly established presences within the
American legal system—as the litigation surveyed above makes clear.
Shared sovereignty also influences the regulatory system through less direct
means. The shared sovereignty paradigm helps to explain what otherwise might
seem to be haphazard results from NEPA litigation, since courts have shown they
are influenced by the comments of agencies with environmental expertise.307 It
is also at work in the involvement of states, tribes, the Council, and the Keeper
in NHPA consultation, although that statute’s structure promotes preservation of
historic properties with less reliance on litigation than NEPA.308 Shared
sovereignty similarly characterizes the federal consultation processes established
by the ESA, in which the Services have a virtually determinative role in assessing
action agencies’ statutory compliance.309 In the case of CWA vetoes under
section 404(c) and resource manager conditions and prescriptions under the FPA,
the expert agencies have an even greater role in permit and license decisions.310
Although the type of sovereignty shared in our study varied quite a bit—
from apparently advisory to virtually determinative to actually determinative—
the notion that a pluralism of federal opinion improved decision making was a
consistent theme. In the twenty-first century, continuing the shared sovereignty
principle that was laid down over four decades ago seems wise, given the
complex scientific, economic, and ecological issues at the root of modern
environmental law.

306. Congress enacted the NHPA in 1966, National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470–470x-6) (repealed and recodified at 54 U.S.C. §§
300101–307108); NEPA in 1970, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h); Section 404(c) of the CWA in 1972, Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1388 et. seq.); and Section 7 of the ESA in 1973, Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87
Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544). By contrast, sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA were
enacted in 1920, Federal Water Power Act, c. 285, § 4, 41 Stat. 1065 (1920) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
791–828c), with section 10(j) added in the Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99–
495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 803(j)).
307. See supra Part II.
308. See supra Part III.
309. See supra Part IV.
310. See supra Part V (section 404(c) permit vetoes), Part VI (FPA licensing).
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for
our online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact
cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website,
http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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